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ABSTRACT
It has been shown in prior research that cost effectiveness in the competitive emissions
permit market could be affected by tacit collusion or price manipulation when the
corresponding polluting product market is oligopolistic. We analyze these cross market
links using a Stackelberg model to show that under reasonable assumptions, there are no
incentives to collude for lobbying prices up. However, incentives for manipulating the
price of permits up appear if there is an initial free allocation of permits, which is a
policy argument against grandfathering and in favor of auctioning. This effect is
increasing with the amount of permits allocated to the leader. Moreover, the changes for
price manipulation increase with those changes that tend to undermine the leader's
advantage in output production or to reduce the leader’s abatement cost.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we check the existence of incentives for oligopolistic firms to
collude in order to inflate the price of emission permits when there is a leader-follower
relationship in the output market.
The use of cap-and trade (CAT) systems has become increasingly popular as a
policy approach to incentivize firms to curb polluting emissions. Important examples
include the US SO2 trading system under the framework of the Acid Rain Program of
the 1990 Clean Air Act as an early application or, more recently, the European Union
Emission Trading System (EU ETS). The main reason why CAT programs are so
attractive and popular among economists is that, theoretically, they allow reducing
emissions in a cost-effective way by means of a price system. As long as marginal
abatement costs differ across firms, incentives for trade exist and the market can play a
positive role in achieving a pre-specified environmental target at a minimum cost.
Regardless of the initial allocation rule chosen for the permits, the costeffectiveness property is well documented in the literature under the assumption of
perfect competition (see Montgomery (1972) in a static setting and Rubin (1996) in a
dynamic framework). Unfortunately, the perfect-market assumption rarely holds in
practice and it is the case that the cost-effectiveness property is challenged if there is
market power in either the permit market, in the associated product market or in both.
The literature analyzing the relationship between imperfect competition and emission
permits can be divided in three different branches, whether market power is introduced
in the permits market, in the good market or in both simultaneously.
Regarding market power in the permit market, the pioneering work is Hahn
(1984). Based on a static model a la Stackelberg, he stated that the efficiency loss due to
market power depends on the initial allocation of permits, and the permit price is an
increasing function of the leader’s allocation. The dominant firm will manipulate the
price (upwards if it is a seller and downwards if it is a buyer), unless the initial
allocation equals the cost-effective one, which requires a perfectly informed regulator.
Hagen & Westskog (1998) extended the Hahn setting in a dynamic two-period model
and found a non-optimal distribution of abatement in an imperfect competitive market
with banking and borrowing.
A second line of research addresses the concurrent existence of market power in
both permit and output markets. This topic has received attention, among other authors,
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by Misiolek & Elder (1989), who extended Hahn´s setting to the product market and
concluded that a single dominant firm can manipulate the permit market to drive up the
fringe firm´s cost in the product market. Hinterman (2011) found that the threshold of
free allocation above which a dominant firm will set the permit price above its marginal
abatement costs is below its optimal emissions in a competitive market, and that overall
efficiency cannot be achieved by means of permit allocation alone
This paper fits within a third branch that considers imperfect competition in the
product market but not in the permit market. The reason to choose this line is twofold.
First, as noted by Montero (2009) and Muller et al. (2002), while market power among
firms is very common in output markets, the existence of market power in emission
permits is more likely to appear when the relevant players are countries rather than
firms or facilities.1 In the latter case, typically there are a very large number of them,
which makes it very difficult that market power arises. It can be argued that this is the
case in the EU ETS, with around 11,000 facilities involved and the latest steps of the
European Commission seem to be in the direction of increasing even more the degree of
competition (for example, by enlarging the number or involved sectors, centralizing the
allocation of permits or moving from grandfathering to auctioning).
As a second reason, The EU-ETS price shock in 2005 generated a great deal of
interest in issues related to market power. Initially, the price of allowances was far in
excess of expectations, but in April 2006 the price suddenly fell and reached zero in
mid-2007. Empirical studies have not been able to perfectly explain those too high price
levels when the number of permits exceeded emissions in every year of the first phase.
Then, it is natural to wonder if the reason for those price oscillations might be
connected to the output market rather than the permit market in the sense that permits
could be used somehow to obtain windfall profits either in the output market or the
market of some important input such as electricity.
In this third line, some articles have shown that perfect competition in the permit
market might not be enough to render a cost-effective outcome if the product market is
not perfectly competitive. In the framework of a Cournot duopoly, Sartzetakis (1997)
compares the efficiency of a competitive emissions market to a command-and-control
1

As an example regarding Annex 1 countries in the Kyoto Protocol, Russia initially received roughly a
fifth of the permits and a third went to USA. Countries with market power can easily manipulate prices up
(down) through tariffs on permit exports (domestic subsidies to cleaner technologies) and also implement
policies regarding the linkage between domestic and foreigner markets. See Barrett (1998) for a related
discussion.
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regulation in which the emissions of each firm are legally fixed. Emission trading
modifies the allocation of emissions among firms and consequently their production
choices. Sartzetakis (2004) shows that welfare can decrease when emission trading is
allowed between asymmetric firms endowed with different abatement and production
technologies. The permit price that clears the market is a weighted average of the value
of emissions of firms under command and control and, therefore, the cost of the more
inefficient firm is reduced while the cost of the more efficient one is increased when
permits trade is introduced.
Meunier (2011) analyzes the efficiency of emission permit trading between two
imperfectly competitive product markets and concludes that even if the firms are price
takers in the permit market, the integration of permit markets can decrease welfare
because of imperfect competition in product markets. Theoretically, if markets are
perfectly competitive, a unique global permit market that covers all polluting activities
would be efficient to allocate an aggregate emissions level. If markets are not perfect
but some firm enjoys market power instead, several permit markets may be more
efficient than an integrated one.
The closest to our paper is the one by Ehrhart et al. (2008), which shows that
collusion in the product market may occur even if the firms are price takers in the
permit market. Under some conditions, a permit price increase leads to higher profits
due to a decrease in product quantities which increases the output price. In the industrial
organization literature this strategy is generally known as “raising rivals' costs”. In the
particular case of an emission permit market, Erhart et al (2008) conclude that firms
might have incentives to collude in order to push the price of permits upwards.
Although this movement has the direct effect of increasing one’s cost, since it also
raises the rival’s, both firms could benefit by restricting the quantity and increasing the
price. They argue that in the EU ETS, even if there is no explicit market power in the
permit market itself, there are loopholes in the trading law that allow collusive behavior
among firms to manipulate the price of permits.
This paper addresses the question if firms’ interests could be aligned to push the
price of permits up (and, therefore, if there are incentives to collude) under Stackelberg
competition. So, we check if the colluding incentives reported by Erhart et al. (2008)
might still arise in a setting that is asymmetric in nature in the sense that there is a
leader and a follower, whereas Erhart et al. restrict to purely symmetric settings.
We first set a general model in which we show that the effect of a higher permit
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price on the leader’s and the follower’s profit is ambiguous. So, the possibility that
firms benefit from a price increase still exists, but the asymmetric role of the firms entail
that such a possibility happens under different conditions for the leader and the
follower, which introduces the possibility that one firm is interested in rising and the
other in decreasing the permit price.
Then, we explore a particular case with a separable cost function to come up
with more accurate insights. As a first central finding, under the reasonable assumption
that the solution is interior (both firms produce, pollute and abate to some extent), we
conclude that both firms face a profit function that is convex in the permit price.
Moreover, within the relevant range, when the price is low enough, both firms will
benefit from a further price reduction, and for high enough prices, the follower would
benefit from a price increase while the leader would still prefer the price to decrease.
Therefore, in the latter range there is no room for collusion. This is in contrast to
Ehrhart et al. (2008), who set a symmetric model and therefore, both firms’ interests are
always aligned. The implication of this finding is that the existence of leadership in
output markets reduces the room for collusive agreements in the permit market.
Actually, in our specific example with a separable function, we conclude that the
collusive region shrinks to the extent that it disappears.
As a first extension, we consider the possibility that some permits are distributed
for free (by means of grandfathering) and we conclude that this possibility opens up the
way for collusive agreements. In fact, apart from the two regions identified in the simple
case, there is a third region in which both firms are interested in pushing the price up
and this region is wider the more permits are distributed for free. This result points out
an important argument against grandfathering in the sense that it could introduce
incentives to foster collusive behavior.
As a second extension, we explore the effect of asymmetries and we conclude
that the chances to face an environment that is propitious for a collusive agreement are
very sensitive to the configuration of the cost parameters of both firms and the
allocation of free permits received by the leader, but not by the follower. In short, those
parameter changes that tend to undermine the leader's advantage in output production
(i.e., an increase in the leader’s cost or a decrease in the follower’s cost) have the effect
of making the firms more symmetric in a certain sense and, therefore, it increases the
chances to observe a collusive behaviour. The opposite happens with the abatement
costs: the chances for a collusive behavior tend to decrease with the leader’s and to
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increase with the follower’s abatement cost. The reason is that, since the leader
produces more output than the follower, its cost is more sensitive to the permit price and
thus it is more difficult for him to get benefited by such a price increase, and this is truer
the higher his abatement cost. On the other hand, an increase in the follower’s
abatement cost reduces the possibility that it is optimal for him to pollute zero, which
widens the interior solution range and, consequently, also the scope for agreement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the basic
model. In Section 3 a particular abatement cost function is considered, including the
basic case and the two extensions. Concluding remarks are given in Section 4 and all
the mathematical proofs are gathered in an appendix.

2. The general model
We set up a simple duopoly Stackelberg model of a polluting industry sector
with tradable permits. Firm 1 is a leader and firm 2 is a follower in the output market.
Following Erhart et al. (2008) we assume no explicit market power in the permit
market, although we implicitly consider the possibility that they might find some extramarket ways to agree in lobbying activities to push the price up or down. 2 For the sake
of comparability with Ehrhart et al. (2008), in this section we assume that the firms do
not enjoy any initial allocation of permits, and so they have to buy all the permits they
need in a market at a given price p (the possibility of an initial endowment of permits is
considered as an extension in Section 3). The game has two stages: in the first stage,
firms sequentially decide on their output levels, x1 and x2 , a la Stackelberg, facing the
inverse demand function P  X  , where X : x1  x2 . In the second stage, they
simultaneously choose on their cost-minimizing emission levels, e1 and e2 .

2

Erhart et al. (2008) argue that, in the EU ETS, there are several loopholes in the trading law that foster
collusion. These loopholes consist in the existence of some mechanisms that create the possibility for a
price manipulation even in the absence of market power. The most important of these mechanisms are
first, the possibility to influence the initial allocation of permits (to make it more stringent), second, the
'opt-in' rule that enables industries not committed to participate in the permits trading system to do so
voluntarily, third, the possibility to implement project-based mechanisms and pay more for these credits
than they would at the market and, fourth, by paying additional emissions duties. Hinterman (2011)
claims that this type of price manipulation could explain the behavior of the price for allowances during
the first phase of the EU ETS, although his model is not fully comparable to ours since he assumes
explicit market power in both output and permit markets.
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The cost function of firm i ∈ (1, 2), Ci  xi , ei  , depends on output (xi) and
emissions (ei) and is continuous and twice differentiable in both arguments with the
following properties:

Ci
0 ,
xi

Ci
0 ,
ei

 2Ci
0,
ei2

 2Ci
 0.
xi ei

(1)

This function integrates production and abatement costs and reflects the fact that
producing clean (with low emissions) is more costly than producing dirty. Every unit of
emissions must be covered by a permit that can be obtained in the market at a given
price p . Considering the cost of permit purchasing, total cost of firm i is given by

TCi  xi , ei  : Ci  xi , ei   pei .

(2)

The model is solved by backward induction. In the second stage of the game
both firms decide their emissions levels to minimize their total cost, TCi  xi , ei  , while
taking their output levels and the price of permits as given. If the solution is interior, we
get the standard first-order condition (FOC),3
Ci
 p  0,
ei

(3)

from which we obtain each firm’s (inverse) demand for permits, ei*  xi , p  . Total
differentiation of the FOC shows that optimal emissions are increasing in output and
decreasing in the permit price:
 2 Ci
 2 Ci
 2 Ci
e
e x
de
dxi  0  i  2 i i  0 ,

i
2
 Ci
ei
ei xi
xi
ei2


 2 Ci
e
1
dei  dp  0  i  2  0 .
2
ei
p  C i
ei2

(4)

(5)

Using the envelope theorem, we conclude that the minimized total cost function
defined as
TC i*  xi , p  : TC  xi , ei*  xi , p    C  xi , ei*  xi , p    pei*  xi , p 

(6)

has the following properties:
3

The second order condition is always fulfilled due to the convexity of Ci in

emissions.
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(10)

Now we move on to the first stage, where the firms choose their output levels.
We start analyzing the follower´s behavior, which faces the following maximization
problem:
Max  2  x1 , x2 , e2*  x2 , p  , p   P  x1  x2  x2  TC2*  x2 , p  .
x2

(11)

The FOC of this problem is
P
TC2*
P  x1  x2  
x2 
 0,
X
x2

(12)

which, solving for x2 , gives the reaction function of the follower, x*2  x1 , p  .
Differentiating the FOC and operating we conclude that the optimal follower's output is
decreasing in the leader's output and the price of permits:

dP

dx2*
dX

0,
dP  2TC2
dx1
2

x22
dX

 2TC2
x2 p
dx2*

0.
dP  2TC2
dp
2

dX
x22

(13)

The leader takes the follower's reaction function into account when maximizing
its own profit. The FOC of the corresponding problem is
P  x2*  TC1
0
P  x1  x2  
x1  1 

x1  x1  x1

(14)

and, by differentiating the FOC, we conclude that the leader's output supply is also
decreasing in the price of permits:
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 2TC1*
dx1*
x1p

0.
2
*
dp P 
x2*   TC1
2

x1 
x1  x12

(15)

Now we are ready to address the main question of this paper, namely the effect
of an increase in the price of permits on the firms’ profit. The question is: could both
firms benefit simultaneously from a price increase as predicted by Erhart et al (2008) in
a symmetric setting? The motivation behind this question is that, if the answer happens
to be positive, both firms might have incentives to collude or, by any means, to lobby in
order to manipulate the price of permits up. For the sake of realism it is relevant to ask
this question in a setting in which the firms play different roles regarding their market
power as we can observe this situation in reality.
By direct differentiation of the profit functions we conclude that the marginal
effect of the price of permits on the profits of both firms is given by the following
expressions:

P x2* * *

x e ,
p X p 1 1

(16)

P  x2*  x1* * *
x2  e2 .
1 

X  x1*  p

(17)

1
 2

p



There are two important points to be stressed here. First, the sign of both
expressions is ambiguous. The reason is that an increase in the price of permits has two
different effects. On the one hand, it drives cost up, which tends to reduce firms' profit
but, on the other hand, it also causes output to decrease and, therefore, the product price
to increase, which can be beneficial for both firms. If the second effect happens to
dominate the first, then profit will increase with the price of permits. If this happens
simultaneously for both firms, there exist incentives to collude in order to manipulate
the price up, as noted by Ehrhart et al. (2008).
Second, the conditions under which a higher price is profit-enhancing are
different for the leader and the follower. This opens up the possibility of a disagreement
between the firms in the sense that one of them is interested in a price increase and the
other one in a price decrease. This is in contrast to Ehrhart et al. (2008), where both
firms are symmetric and, therefore, either both firms are better-off or both are worse-off
after a price increase. This asymmetry seems to reduce the scope for a price
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manipulation agreement. At this level of generality it is not possible to get more specific
insights. For that reason, we explore a specific case in the next section.

3. A Separable Function
To get some additional insight, in this section we assume a particular abatement
cost function which is separable from production cost. We initially consider that there is
no grandfathering and the cost functions of both firms are exactly the same, so that the
only difference between them is due to their roles as leader and follower. After studying
this basic case, we explore, first, the effect of distributing free permits to the firms and,
second, the consequences of considering cost asymmetries.

3.1. Basic case

Assume that the production and abatement costs are separable in the following
way. The production cost of firm i is given by cxi , so there is a constant marginal
production cost equal to c. The (inverse) demand function for output has the linear form
P  X   a  bX . Every unit of output generates r units of pollution, where r  0 is a

constant coefficient of pollution intensity, (thus, gross emissions of firm i are given by
rxi). By performing abatement activities, firms can reduce their flow of pollution.
Denote as qi ≥ 0 the amount of emissions abated by firm i. Then, net emissions are
given by ei = rxi – qi. Following Sarzetakis (1997) we assume the following quadratic
abatement cost function, which is common for both firms:

AC  qi   qi  d  tqi  ,

(18)

where d and t are positive parameters. Adding up the costs of production, abatement and
permit purchasing, and using the definition of qi, we can write total cost as a function of
output and emissions as in the general model:

TCi  xi , ei   cxi   rxi  ei   d  t  rxi  ei    pei .

(19)

To ensure interior solution we bound the relevant parameters by including the
following technical assumption:
Assumption 1: d  p  p , where p : p / e2*  x2* , p   0 .

(20)

This assumption rules out uninteresting solutions in which any of the firms
either produces zero, pollutes zero or abates zero. The lower bound for p prevents
abatement from being negative (see equation (22) below). To understand this result,
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note that d is the marginal cost of abatement at q  0 . If the price of permits is even
lower than the cost of the first unit of abatement, this means that it will never be
profitable for the firms to abate, since buying permits is a cheaper option. The upper
bound for p is defined as that value of the permit price such that, in equilibrium, it is
optimal for the follower to pollute zero.4 The reason to include this assumption is that,
in our setting, the follower’s emissions is the first variable to reach a zero value as

p increases and, therefore, this is a sufficient condition to ensure a nonnegative
solution.5
Proceeding as in the general model, we solve first the second stage, where both
firms choose their emission levels. Endowed with our specific analytical expressions,
we can compute the optimal amount of emissions of firm i as a function of output:

ei*  xi , p  

dp
 rxi ,
2t

(21)

from which it is straightforward to conclude that firm i's optimal abatement is
qi*  p  

pd
 0,
2t

(22)

which, due to separability, is independent of output. Using (21) in (19) we get the
expression for the minimized cost function, which reveals that marginal product cost is
constant in output and increasing in the permit price:
TC  xi , p   xi  c  pr 
*
i

d  p

4t

2

.

(23)

Now, we move on to solve the first stage, in which both firms decide on their
output levels. By standard methods,6 we get

x1* 

a  c  rp
,
2b

(24)

x2* 

a  c  rp
.
4b

(25)

4

The specific expression for p can be found in the appendix. Specifically, it is given by (A3) in the
basic model, but it takes a different form in the extensions developed below.
5
If both the follower’s abatement and the follower’s net emissions are nonnegative, it is straightforward
to conclude that the follower’s gross emissions, rx2 , are nonnegative, which implies that the follower’s
output is nonnegative. As we show below, in equilibrium the leader always produces more and pollutes
more than the follower and, thus, Assumptions 1 ensures that all the relevant variables of the model are
nonnegative in equilibrium.
6
The follower chooses x2 to maximize its profit while taking x1 as given. The leader chooses x1 to
maximize its own profit taking into account the follower’s reaction function.
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From (24) and (25) we conclude that the leader’s output is twice as much as the
follower’s as in the classical Stackelberg model with linear demand and constant
marginal cost. As always, both firms’ output depend positively on the demand intercept,
a, and negatively on the demand slope, b, and all the cost parameters c, r and p. We can
now compute the equilibrium value of both firms’ profit as a function of the price of
permits, defined as:
*i  p  :  a  b  x1*  x2*   xi*  TCi*  xi* , p  ,

(26)

and for notational convenience, we define
pˆ i : arg min *i  p  i  1, 2 .
p

(27)

Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 show the main results of this part of the paper.
Lemma 1 determines the shape of the equilibrium profit functions and, as a
straightforward implication, Proposition 1 splits the relevant range for the permit price
in two regions with different consequences on the interests of the firms regarding the
evolution of p .

LEMMA 1

1*  p  and  *2  p  are strictly convex functions of p with d  pˆ 2  pˆ1  p .
PROPOSITION 1

If d  p  pˆ 2 , a price decrease would make the profit of both firms to increase. If
p̂2  p  p , a price increase will decrease the leader´s profit and increase the
follower´s profit.
The results in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 are illustrated in Figure 1. There are
two important facts to be underlined in this figure. First, the profit of firm i is strictly
convex in p with a minimum at pˆ i (for i=1, 2). We can get some insight about the
reasons that underline the shape of the profit functions by dissecting the effects of an
increase in the price of permits.
When p increases, both firms respond by producing less, abating more and,
thus, emitting less. These responses have effects on both revenues and costs. Revenue is
a strictly concave, inverted-U shaped function of p . When p is low, the resulting
reduction in output induces a revenue-enhancing increase in the price of output,
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whereas, for large values of p , the negative effect on output prevails. Regarding costs,
there are three effects: production cost decreases linearly, abatement cost increases
quadratically due to the shape of the abatement function and the cost of purchasing
permits decreases quadratically due to the substitution of permits for abatement and, in
marginal terms, the latter effect turns out to dominate all the others for large values of
p.
The second insight from Figure 1 is that the minima of the profit functions are
unambiguously ordered such that p̂2 < p̂1 , i.e., the follower reaches a minimum for a
lower price than the leader. As a matter of fact, it can be proved that

1  2

, i.e.,
p
p

for any value of p , the leader’s profit decreases more or increases less than the
follower’s. As a consequence, we have that, if p < p̂2 , both firms are in the decreasing
part of their profit functions, which implies that their profit would increase if the permit
price decreased. If, instead, p̂2 < p < p̂1 , the follower is in the increasing part (and so it
would benefit from a price increase) whereas the leader is still in the decreasing part
(and, therefore, it would still prefer the price to decrease). Intuitively, the reason why
the profit of firm 2 reaches a minimum before firm 1 is that, being a Stackelberg
follower, it is optimal for firm 2 to produce less than firm 1 and, therefore, to pollute
less. This implies that the direct effect of a price increase is milder as compared to the
indirect effect (the rival’s cost rise with the resulting increase in the output price).
Apparently, if p > p̂1 the leader enters the increasing part of its profit function
and, therefore, both firms would benefit from a higher price, but under our specification,
it is the case that p̂1  p , i.e., the minimum of the leader’s profit function is reached
precisely at the highest value of the price that is compatible with an interior solution.
(specifically, e2 < 0 for any p  pˆ1 ) and so there is no feasible range under which both
firms would benefit from a price increase.7

7

For analytical simplicity (an also for the sake of realism) we do not discuss in detail the corner solution
range, since the case in which any of the firms does not pollute at all seems uninteresting. Actually, if we
rule out negative emissions, what happens to the right of p is that, for firm 2, it is optimal not to pollute
at all ( e2  0 ) and, therefore, in this range its cost is not directly affected by the price of permits, while
the leader’s is. The expressions for output and profits that we have derived are valid only under the
interior solution scenario. If we allow for corner solutions with e2  0 , then we come up with different
expressions and, using these expressions we conclude that, in the vicinity (to the right) of p , the leader’s
output and profit are still decreasing (in the price) while the follower’s output and profit are increasing.

13

The main consequence of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 is that, in our example,
there is a range where both firms are interested in decreasing the price but, unlike the
symmetric case developed by Ehrhart el al. (2008), it is never the case that both firms
simultaneously profit from a price increase, and therefore they never have incentives to
lobby in order to press the price up. Moreover, there is a range of disagreement in which
the interests of both firms diverge, which can never happen in the symmetric case.

i
1*  p 
 *2  p 

d

p̂2
Region I

p̂1  p

p

Region II

FIGURE 1: Equilibrium profits as a function of p (basic case)
In this example we have illustrated how the asymmetry between the firms (in the
sense of a leader-follower relationship) reduces the chances for collusive behavior so
much that they disappear. In the next subsections we show two generalizations of this
example where the result is not so extreme in the sense that the chances for collusive
agreements decrease with respect to a purely symmetric setting but they do not fully
disappear.

3.2. Grandfathering

Up to now, for comparability with Erhart et al. (2008), we have assumed that the
firms do not have any initial allocation of permits and, therefore, they have to buy all
the permits they need in the market. In reality, it is common that the participants in CAP
systems receive a number of permits for free by means of a grandfathering scheme. In
fact, as it is discussed for example in Alvarez and André (2014), grandfathering has
traditionally been the most widespread method to distribute permits.
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We now extend our setting to consider the possibility that some permits are
initially distributed with no cost for the firms by a grandfathering scheme.8 So, the firms
only need to buy those permits that exceed their initial allocation and, moreover, they
have the option to sell permits if they pollute less than their initial allocation.
Consider that both firms receive an equal allocation of free permits, S , and
denote as yi the amount of permits that firm i buys (if yi  0 ) or sells (if yi  0 ) in the
market, which can be calculated as the difference between net emissions and the
allocation of permits:
yi  ei  S  rxi  qi  S ,

(28)

from which we get ei  yi  S , i.e., the net emissions of a firm must be covered by
permits that either come from her free allocation or are bought in the market. Therefore
firm i’s total cost function is now given by the expression:

TCi  xi , yi   cxi   rxi  yi  S   d  t  rxi  yi  S    pyi ,

(29)

which can be written in terms of output and net emissions as

TCi  xi , ei   cxi   rxi  ei   d  t  rxi  ei    p  ei  S  .

(30)

Solving the second stage of the game we conclude that the optimal levels of
emissions and abatement for each firm are still given by (21) and (21’) respectively, and
it is straightforward to obtain the optimal traded permits and the corresponding
minimized cost function:
yi*  xi , p  

TC

*
i

dp
 rxi  S ,
2t

 xi , p   xi  c  pr 

d  p 

4t

(31)

2

 pS ,

(32)

where separability entails that the minimized cost function has the same structure as in
the basic case, except for the fact that the value of the endowment of free permits
appears as a reduction in the cost. Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 are the main results of
this part. We still use the notation introduced in (26) to refer to the value of the permit
price that minimizes each profit function. For notational convenience we also define
r  a  c  dr 
.
S :
8b

8

Actually, the fact that the permits are distributed for free is not crucial for our results. The only
important assumption is that the firms enjoy an exogenously given amount of permits.
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LEMMA 2

When both firms are initially endowed with the same free allocation of permits, S , the
equilibrium profit functions for both firms are strictly convex with a unique minimum
each at pˆ i for i  1, 2 , with

pˆ i
 0 . Moreover, the relevant thresholds are ordered in
S

the following way:
a) If S  S , then d  pˆ 2  pˆ1  p .
b) If S  S  2S , then pˆ 2  d  pˆ1  p .
c) If S  2 S , then pˆ 2  pˆ1  d  p .

PROPOSITION 2

When both firms are initially endowed with a free allocation of permits, the following
results hold:
a) If S  S the relevant range of values for p has three regions: In region I, defined by
d  p  pˆ 2 , both firms get better off when p decreases. In region II, defined by
p̂2 < p < p̂1 , the leader gets better off when p decreases and the follower gets better off
when p increases. In region III, defined by p̂1  p  p , both firms get better off when p
increases.
b) If S  S  2S , region I disappears and region II is delimited by d  p  pˆ1 .
c) If S  2S , regions I and II disappear and region III is defined by the whole feasible
range,  d , p  .

i
1*  p 
 *2  p 

p

d

p̂2
Reg. I

p̂1
Reg. II

p
Reg. III

FIGURE 2: Equilibrium profits as a function of p (basic case)
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The consequences of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 are the following. The profit
of both firms is still strictly convex in the price of permits, with a minimum at price pˆ i ,
i =1, 2. When grandfathering is introduced, the values of the permit price at which the
minima are reached, p̂1 and p̂2 , shift to the left and they shift more the higher the value
of S . This shift implies, for each firm, that there is wider range of the permit price such
that it gets better-off when the price increases. The reason is that the existence of free
permits makes permit purchasing less costly for firms and, moreover, it opens the way
from getting positive revenues by selling some permits.
More importantly, if we focus on case a) (with S  S ), when grandfathering is
included, we have three regions instead of two, as illustrated in Figure 2. In region III,
to the right of p̂1 , both firms profit from a price increase, while the solution is still
interior ( e1 , e2  0 ). Technically, the reason why this new region arises is that, now, the
direct effect of a price increase on cost is softer since the firms have to buy fewer
permits. It can also be the case, if the price is high enough, that it is profitable for the
firms to sell part of their free endowment instead of buying additional permits, which
provides a new opportunity to increase profits. Anyway, at p̂1 we have that y1  0 i.e.,
at the point where the leader starts finding it profitable to increase the price, it is still a
net buyer of permits and so the profit-enhancing effect is not due to selling permits yet.
Moreover, if the initial allocation of permits is large enough, it could be the case
that region I disappears, which implies that the follower is always interested in
manipulating the price of permits up (case b) in Lemma 2 and Proposition 2), or even
that both regions I and II disappear, which implies that both the leader and the follower
are always interested in manipulating the price up. This is, of course, the most favorable
case for collusion.
The focus of this paper is on region III since this is the only one in which firms
can find it profitable to collude in order to push the price up. One natural question is
how large this region is or, in other words, how likely it is that we fall in this region. To
answer this question, we focus on case a) ( S  S ), which is the richer one and perhaps
the most realistic (the discussion of the other two cases is straightforward). Then, region
III is delimited by two threshold values for p: First, p̂1 , which is the price above which
it is profitable, not only for the follower, but also for the leader to push the price up. The
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second threshold is the upper bound, p , which is the highest value of the price
compatible with an interior solution. By computing the difference between these two
thresholds, we get the size of region III,
p  pˆ1 

4btS
,
2b  tr 2

which depends positively on the number of free permits, as well as the slope of the
demand curve, b, and the abatement cost parameter t, whereas it depends negatively on
the emissions intensity parameter r.

3.3. Asymmetric cost

In the previous developments we have considered that both firms were fully
symmetric in terms of cost functions and also, in the case of grandfathering, in terms of
free permit endowment. There are two reasons to hold this assumption. The first is
simplicity. The second is to focus on the leader-follower relationship as the (only)
source of asymmetry between firms.
In this subsection we consider the possibility that firms are asymmetric in terms
of cost and/or initial permit endowment and we explore the effect of these asymmetries
on the chances to generate a propitious environment for a collusive behavior. In other
words, we explore the effect of different parameters on the size of region III as it was
defined in the previous subsection.
To account for cost asymmetry, we denote the production cost of firm i as ci xi ,
where ci is a firm-specific unit cost parameter. Since we have postulated that firm 1 is a
leader and firm 2 is a follower in the output market, it is natural to conjecture that
c1  c2 , i.e., the position of the leader might well be due to the fact that it enjoys a cost
advantage, but nothing prevents us from considering the opposite case. Analogously,
firm i’s abatement cost function is given by:
ACi  qi   qi  di  ti qi  ,

i = 1, 2.

(33)

Finally, each firm might receive an initial free endowment of permits, Si, which
is not necessarily constant across firms. Proceeding as in the basic case, we conclude
that, in the second stage, the optimal amounts of emissions, abatement and purchase of
permits for each firm are given, respectively, by9
9

Unlike the rest of parameters, we assume that the emissions intensity parameters, r, is common for both
firms, i.e., r1  r2  r . There are two pragmatic reasons for this simplification. First, the sensitivity analysis
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ei*  xi , p  

di  p
 rxi ,
2ti

qi*  p  

(34)

p  di
,
2ti

yi*  xi , p   rxi 

p  di
 Si ,
2t

and moving on to the first stage we can compute the equilibrium levels of output:

x1* 

a  c2  2c1  rp
,
2b

(35)

x2* 

a  2c1  3c2  rp
.
4b

(36)

To investigate the chances to observe a collusive behavior we proceed by
analyzing the effect of different parameters on the size of region III. In the previous
subsection we concluded that, simply by introducing a constant initial allocation of
permits, we come up with three different cases. Now, due to the larger number of
varying parameters, by choosing the right combination of them we could generate
almost any imaginable case. Hence, we need to bound the range of possibilities in some
way to avoid, on the one hand, meaningless results (such as negative output, negative
abatement or negative emissions) and, on the other hand, a qualitative change in the
nature of the solution. For this reason, in this subsection we introduce the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1’: max d1 , d 2   p  p , where p is defined in (20).
Assumption 2: e1  e2 .
Assumption 3: pˆ 2  pˆ1 .

The two first assumptions ensure nonnegative values for all the relevant
variables. The idea is that, under any plausible scenario, the leader will still be the one
who produces a larger amount of output and a larger amount of emissions. As a
consequence, the follower will still be the one who finds it profitable to pollute zero for
a lower value of p and such a value determines the upper bound for the range that is

results related to these parameters are unclear and so we do not come up with any valuable insight by
exploring them. Second, the sign of some equilibrium values for some of the key variables are affected by
the terms 2r1  r2 and/or 3r1  2r2 and this fact, anyway, forces us to keep the asymmetry between these
parameters bounded to avoid meaningless results.
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compatible with an interior solution, p . If this is the case, it is natural to accept that
Assumption 3 also holds, i.e., it is easier for the follower than it is for the leader to
benefit from a price increase.
Under these assumptions, region III is delimited by p̂1 and p and hence its size
increases if p increases and/or p̂1 decreases. Proposition 3 summarizes how the size of
this region depends on the parameters of the model. Table 1 presents a taxonomy of all
the relevant effects.
PROPOSITION 3

The size of region III is increasing in the following cases:
a) If the leader’s marginal production cost, c1 , increases or the follower’s marginal
production cost, c2 , decreases.
b) If the parameter of the linear term in the abatement cost function decreases for the
leader ( d1 ) or increases for the follower ( d 2 ).
c) If the parameter of the quadratic term in the leader abatement cost function, t1 ,
decreases (provided the number of free permits is moderate) or the equivalent
follower’s parameter, t2 , increases.
d) If the number of free permits received by the leader, S1 , is increasing regardless of
the free permits received by the follower.
Effects on
thresholds

p
p̂1

  p  pˆ1 

Changes in parameters of the model
d1
d2
t1
t2

c1

c2

+
-

+

0
+

+
0

0
+ (*)

+

-

-

+

- (*)

S1

S2

+
0

0
-

0
0

+

+

0

Table 1. Summary of sensitivity analysis results.
(*)

For a moderate value of S1.

Regarding point a) in Proposition 3, increasing the leader’s production cost or
reducing the follower’s cost tends to erode the leader’s advantage with respect to the
follower, which has the effect of making the firms more symmetric in terms of their
position in the market. The more symmetric the firms are, the more aligned their
interests are and, hence, it is more likely that they find it profitable to collude. Table 1
reveals that increasing c1 has a double effect: on the one hand, p grows because the
output of the follower increases, which makes it less likely that firm 2 decides not to
emit at all (in other words, the range of prices under which there is an interior solution
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widens). On the other hand, p̂1 decreases since, due to a higher cost, firm 1 tends to
produce less, to emit less and, therefore, its total cost is less sensitive to an increase in
the price of permits. Both of these effects tend to enlarge the agreement region. Just the
opposite happens when c2 increases: firm 1 tends to produce more and pollute more and
hence its cost becomes more sensitive to an increase in the price of permits (which
increases the value of p̂1 ) whereas the follower tends to produce less and to reach
sooner the point where it finds it profitable to stop polluting ( p decreases), which
reduces the size of the agreement region.
As it comes to the parameters of the abatement cost function ( di and ti ) notice
that, due to separability, each firm’s parameters are only relevant for the own firm, but
not for its rival. Both the linear and the quadratic term of firm 2 are irrelevant to
determine the value of p̂1 but increasing any of them makes the follower’s abatement
cost to increase, which in turn makes it less likely to reach the point where it decides to
pollute zero or, in other words, it enlarges the relevant feasible range. The
corresponding parameters for firm 1 do not matter to determine the value of p and
their only relevant effect is on p̂1 . Assuming a moderate value of the leader's initial
endowment of permits, any increase in d1 and t1 makes the leader's abatement cost
higher, which makes firm 1 becomes more sensitive to increases in the price of permits.
Finally, the initial allocation of permits is irrelevant for the upper bound of p
since it represents just a fixed term in the cost (and the profit) function and so the
optimal decisions are not affected. The value of a firm’s profits is affected by its own
endowment (not the rival’s), and hence only S1 is relevant to determine the size of
region III. When the leader’s free endowment increases, its cost becomes less sensitive
to an increase in the permits price and, therefore, it would be more receptive to the idea
of pushing the price up, which increases the chances of a collusive behavior.

4. Conclusions and policy implications
We have explored the possibility that two firms that compete a la Stackelberg in
the output market and are subject to a CAT system could have incentives to manipulate
the price of permits up. We do so in a framework similar to the one by Erhart et al.
(2008) with the difference that they restrict to symmetric situations whereas we explore
a situation that is asymmetric in nature. The main research question is if the incentives
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for this type of collusive behavior, which have been reported by Erhart et al. (2008) for
symmetric models, still exist in a situation in which some firm has a dominant position
and other or others act as followers.
In a general model, we have shown that the effect of a permit price increase on
the firms' profit has an ambiguous sign. This opens the way for the firms to benefit from
a price increase and the possibility to make collusive agreements in order to manipulate
the price up. Nevertheless, the asymmetric role of each firm causes that the conditions
under which a price is profit-enhancing are different for each of them.
Under a separable cost function we show, first, that the profit functions are
strictly convex in the permit price and, second, that the minima of the profit functions
are different for both firms, which creates a region of disagreement where the leader
prefers that the price goes down whereas the follower prefers it to go up. This situation
is ruled out in Erhart et al. (2008) by construction since the interests of fully symmetric
firms are always aligned.
The main message is that a leader-follower relationship between firms reduces
the scope for an agreement between the firms to manipulate the price up. Actually, in
the basic case in which there are no free permits distributed among the firms and the
cost functions are symmetric, the region where there incentives to collude shrinks to the
extent to disappear. Then main policy implication of this finding is that a situation of
market power in the product market can prevent the existence of incentives for collusion
in the permit market.
Another policy implication of our research is that distributing some permits for
free (e.g. by means of grandfathering) opens up the possibility for collusive behaviour
and the more permits are distributed by a non-market scheme, particularly to the firms
that enjoy market power, the more incentives for collusion. The European Union is
reducing the use of grandfathering and increasing the use of auctioning to distribute
emission permits. The 2008 revised European Emission Trading Directive established
as a fundamental change for the third trading period, starting in 2013, the mandate that
auctioning of allowances is to be the default method for allocating allowances. The
arguments posed by the European Commission (EC) to support the introduction of
auctions are that auctioning "best ensures the efficiency, transparency and simplicity of
the system, creates the greatest incentives for investment in a low-carbon economy and

22

eliminates windfall profits".10 Our results suggest an additional argument to reduce the
use of grandfathering (and, arguably, to increase the use of auctioning) as it might
introduce incentives for price manipulation.
Our final insight is that the chances for the firms to find collusion profitable are
very sensitive to the cost asymmetries between them. In general terms, the more
asymmetric the firms are, the more difficult collusion becomes.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1

Using (23) and (24) in (21) we get the equilibrium values for emissions:

e  x , p 
*
1

*
1

e  x , p 
*
2

*
2

db  rt  a  c   p  b  tr 2 

2bt

,

2bd  tr  a  c   p  2b  tr 2 
4bt

(A1)
,

(A2)

and using the definition given in (20), we compute the value of p by equating (A2) to
zero:
e2*  x2* , p   0  p  p 

2bd  rt  a  c 
.
2b  tr 2

(A3)

Using (23) and (24) in the inverse demand expression P  X   a  bX we get
the equilibrium price of output: P 

a  3  c  pr 
. Using the expressions for x1 , x2 , e1 ,
4

e2 and P together with (19), we get the expressions for the equilibrium profits of both

firms:
 *1  p  

t  a  c  pr   2b  d  p 
,
8bt
2

2

t  a  c  pr   4b  d  p 
  p 
.
16bt
2

2

*
2

Differentiating twice with respect to p we conclude that the second derivative
of both functions is positive and, thus, both of them are strictly convex in p . By
inspection of the first derivative, and bearing (A3) in mind, we conclude that 1 has a
minimum at p  pˆ1  p , which implies that 1 is decreasing in p for all the feasible
values of p below p . In a similar way, we conclude that  2 has a minimum at
pˆ 2 :

tr  a  c   4bd
, which implies that  2 is decreasing in p for p  p2 and
4b  tr 2

increasing for p  p2 .
The last step is to check that the thresholds are ordered in the right way. By
direct comparison we conclude that
d  pˆ 2  p  a  c  dr .
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To prove that the last inequality is true, using (21') and the definition of
abatement ( qi  rxi  ei ) we conclude that, in the relevant range, x2 

e2
 0 . Using the
r

expression for x2* given in (24) we conclude that x2  0 implies a  c  rp , and this
inequality, together with the first part of Assumption 2 ( d  p ), implies

a  c  dr . QED.

Proof of Proposition 1

The result straightforwardly follow from Lemma 1: the relevant range for p is
delimited by d and p . Since  *2 is strictly convex and it reaches at minimum at p̂2 ,
we conclude that it is strictly decreasing between d and p̂2 and strictly increasing
between p̂2 and p . Since 1* is strictly convex and it reaches at minimum at p̂1  p , it
is strictly decreasing between d and p . This completes the proof.

QED.

Proof of Lemma 2

Since the expressions for ei (i=1,2) are the same as in the basic case and the
minimized cost function (31) is the same as (22) except for a constant term, it
immediately follows that the expressions for xi (i=1,2) are also the same as in the basic
case. Using these values we get the equilibrium profits of both firms

t  a  c  pr   2b  d  p   8btpS
,
  p   P  x  x  x  TC  x , p  
8bt
2

*
1

*
1

*
2

*
1

*
1

2

*
1

t  a  c  pr   4b  d  p   16btpS
.
  p   P  x  x  x  TC  x , p  
16bt
2

*
2

*
1

*
2

*
2

*
2

2

*
2

The second derivative reveals that these functions are still strictly convex.
Differentiating them with respect to p we conclude that they have respective minima at
rt  a  c   2bd  4btS
,
2b  tr 2
rt  a  c   4bd  8btS
Arg min  *2  p   pˆ 2 
,
p
4b  tr 2
Arg min 1*  p   pˆ1 
p

and it is straightforward that both p̂1 and p̂2 depend negatively on S .
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Regarding the order of the thresholds, by direct comparison we conclude that
pˆ1  pˆ 2  2brt  a  c  dr  2rSt   0 , but in the proof of Proposition 1 we have proved

a  c  dr  0 , which ensures that pˆ1  pˆ 2 . Moreover, using (20’) we also conclude that
p  pˆ1 

4btS
 pˆ1 . So, we have pˆ 2  pˆ1  p . To determine the relative position of
2b  tr 2

d , first recall that, from Lemma 1, we know d  p and so we only have to check if d

is below p̂2 , in the interval  pˆ 2 , pˆ1  or in the interval  pˆ1 , p  . By direct comparison we
conclude the following:
pˆ1  d  S 

r  a  c  dr 
 2 S ,
4b

(A4)

pˆ 2  d  S 

r  a  c  rd  
S.
8b

(A5)

This completes the proof.

QED.

Proof of Proposition 2

Consider first statement a). The results in regions I and II follow from Lemma 2
according to a similar reasoning to that used in the proof of Proposition 1. In region III,
between p̂1 and p , it is straightforward to conclude that both 1*  p  and  *2  p  are
strictly increasing in p . Statements b) and c) straightforwardly follow form (A4), (A5)
and Assumption 2.

QED.

Proof of Proposition 3

Using (34) and (35) in (33) we get the equilibrium values for emissions:

e1*  x1* , p  
e2*  x2* , p  

b  d1  p   t1r  a  c2  2c1  rp 
2bt1

2b  d 2  p   rt2  a  2c1  3c2  rp 
4bt2

By imposing the non-negativity conditions to the follower’s emissions we get
the upper bound value for the permit price, p :

e2*  0  p  p :

2bd 2  rt2  a  3c2  2c1 
2b  r 2t2

(A6)
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By substitution of the relevant variables in the profit function we obtain the expression
for the leader’s profit function in terms of the parameters of the model:
1  x , x , y , p 
*
2

*
1

*
2

 a  c2  2c1  rp 


2

8b

d  p
 1
4t1

2

 pS1

Differentiating with respect to p we obtain
1 2b  p  d1   4bt1S1  rt1  a  c2  2c1  rp 

p
4bt1

And by equating this derivative to zero we get the minimum value of p such that the
leader finds it profitable to push the price up, p̂1 :
rt  a  c2  2c1   2bd1  4bt1S1
1
 0  p  pˆ1 : 1
p
r 2t1  2b

(A7)

By direct differentiation of the values of p and p̂1 we obtain the results in the
proposition:

p
2rt2

0;
c1 2b  r 2t2
p
3rt2

0;
c2 2b  r 2t2
p
0;
d1
p
2b

0;
d 2 2b  r 2t2
p
p

0;
S1 S 2
pˆ1
4bt1

0;
S1 2b  rt1

pˆ1
2rt1

0;
c1 2b  rt1
rt1
pˆ1

0;
c2 2b  rt1
pˆ1
2b

0;
d1 2b  rt1
pˆ1
0;
d 2

pˆ1
0;
S 2

2
r  a  c2  2c1  d1r 
pˆ1 2br  a  c2  2c1  d1r   8b S1




S
0
1
t1
4b
 r 2t1  2b 

p 2br  a  3c2  2c1  rd 2 

0
2
2
t2
2
b

r
t


2

where, in an interior solution, the numerator of the last expression must be positive for
the follower’s output to be positive.
QED.
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